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Abstract 
A lot of research on Computer Aided Systems Engineering, CASE, is oriented toward 
technical solutions. In contrast, this paper discusses not technical, but organizational 
aspects of CASE-technology: how this technology is embedded in organizations. Based on 
interviews with key players in 18 companies in the Netherlands, the change management 
process of introducing CASE-technology is discussed from the perspectives of culture, 
structure and control process. It is concluded that in order to implement CASE-technol-
ogy successfully, CASE should be regarded as a process of organization development 
(OD), ie. a cultural change process. Aspects of structure, culture, and control all seem to 
influence the success of implementation of CASE-technology. 
1. Introduction 
CASE-technology has been the latest silver bullet in the Information Technology (IT) 
market. For a lot of people, it provides the barrels of gold at the end of the rainbow 
(see the descriptions of CASE in, for example, McClure 1989, Gane 1990, Parkinson 
1991). This may explain the attention CASE-technology receives in the academie 
world. Most of this research is oriented towards comparison and development of tools 
(see Wynekoop and Conger 1991). But the market for this technology is very 
dynamic, and the concepts of systems development are still evolving. And just because 
of this dynamism and instability, issues of power and culture tend to heavily influence 
the success of implementing CASE; some use the potentials of CASE to promote and 
introducé the technology, whereas others use the instability and fact that the technol-
ogy is nonproven to fight against it. In this respect, implementation of CASE-technol-
ogy may be a useful indicator for implementation of Information Technology (IT) in 
general. 
In order to fill the gap between practical experience and theory, and add to the 
knowledge in the area of CASE-technology, implementation aspects of CASE-
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technology have been researched. The research is based on interviews at 18 organiz-
ations in the Netherlands that have implemented CASE-technology. Key figures in 
these organizations were asked about the state of software technology in their 
company, issues of culture, internal environment, external environment, traditions and 
implementation of CASE. For a detailed discussion we refer to Fischer (1992). 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses three concepts that may be of 
importance when introducing CASE-technology: culture, structure and the process of 
control, which is presented as a link between structure and culture. Based on these 
three concepts, interview research was carried out. In section 3 the results of the 
interview research are discussed. An overview is presented of the organizations that 
participated in the research, and two aspects are described that are useful to discuss 
the results: the process of the change, and the success of the change. Based on these 
aspects, the results of the interview research are discussed from the perspectives of 
culture, structure, and the process of control. Section 4 summarizes the results. 
2. Innovation and organizational change due to information technology 
In order to assess which organizational aspects play a role, if any, when implementing 
CASE-technology, concepts of organizational change and innovation have to be 
known. If CASE-technology is regarded as innovation, as is done by for example 
Rockart and Hofman (1992), the success of implementation of CASE-technology will 
depend on the extent to which an IT department is capable of introducing innova-
tions. In this section, an overview is presented of three concepts that were used for 
the research: structure, culture, and control. The relation of each of this concepts to 
innovation in general, and to introduction of CASE-technology in specific, is dis-
cussed. 
2.1. Structure and innovation 
The framework of Henry Mintzberg is the most popular for describing the type of 
structure of an organization. In his book The Structuring of Organizations (Mintzberg 
1979), he proposes five types of organizations. Based on the concept of power, he 
added two other configurations in his book Power In and Around Organizations 
(Mintzberg 1983). What results are seven types of organizations - entrepreneurial, 
machine, diversified, professional, innovative, missionary and political - that are 
described in terms of several coordinating mechanisms. 
The concept of structure as described by Henry Mintzberg can be applied to IT/EDP 
departments. The EDP department has its own structure, its own environment and its 
own coordinating mechanisms, and thus can be described as a smaller organization 
within a larger one. In order to apply the framework of Mintzberg to the EDP 
department, we have to go back to the concepts that define the various structures: the 
characteristics of the environment and of the tasks. This leaves us with four of the 
seven structures: professional and machine bureaucracy, adhocracy and simple 
structure. Depending on the task - the technology used - and the environment, a 
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different structure is appropriate. For example, an environment and a technology that 
are both dynamic and complex should be met with ad hoc organizational responses 
and constant mutual adjustments, i.e. an adhocracy. 
What have these structures to do with innovation? Every configuration may be 
characterized by a certain type of technology (Cusumano 1991). Depending on the 
type of technology, e.g. routine or nonroutine, an organization is capable of adopting 
new technologies in a fast way or not. Perrow uses four classifications of technologies 
(Cusumano 1991): routine, engineering, nonroutine and unit (see table 1). Organiza-
tions dealing with routine technologies encounter few exceptions and therefore face 
problems that, over time, become easier to analyze and solve through formal 
procedures and tools. Firms dealing with engineering technologies have more 
exceptions, but still are relatively defined and managed systematically. Craft technol-
ogies and nonroutine technologies on the other hand are very difficult to define and 
manage systematically. 
Table I. Organizational structure and technology (Source: Cusumano, 1991) 
Structure Technology Tasks & problems Characteristics 
Machine Bureaucracy Routine, mass production Few exceptions, well defined Standardized and deskilled 
work, centralization, division 
of 
labour, high 
formalization of rules and pro-
cedures 
Professional Bureau- Engineering Many exceptions, well defined Standardized and specialized 
cracy skills, decentralization, low for-
malization 
Adhocracy Non routine Many exceptions, ill defined Specialized skills but few or no 
organization 
standards, decentralization, low 
formalization 
Simple Structure Unit or craft Few exceptions, ill defined Few standardized skills, cen-
tralized authority but low for-
malization 
Since software technology commonly has to deal with many exceptions, but relatively 
well defined problems, why then is not every EDP department organized as a profess-
ional bureaucracy? There are at least two reasons for this: 
o sometimes one perceives the technology as having few exceptions and well 
defined problems, instead of many exceptions and relatively well defined pro-
blems. So, one regards the technology as routine, not as engineering. And the 
IT department is structured accordingly. 
o as Mintzberg argues (1983) the structure is determined by task, i.e. technology, 
as well as environment. So, technology is not the only determinant. The 
environment may also determine the structure of the IT department. For the 
IT department, the environment is not only the outside environment of the 
whole organization, but the organization itself as well. 
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This leaves us with all except one possible structure for the IT department: the 
diversified form, which is typical for large multinationals, not for single departments. 
As discussed above, some of the remaining structures are more innovative than other 
structures. According to Mintzberg, the adhocracy is the most innovative structure. It 
is organized to be innovative, relying on teams of experts, and having a flat hierarchy. 
The professional bureaucracy is also innovative, but to a lesser extent because the 
organization is not quite flat. Not very innovative are the machine bureaucracy and 
the ideology. Finally, the innovativeness of the politicized organization and of the 
simple structure depends on the power of management. In order to successfully 
introducé CASE-technology, the structure of the IT organization should allow for 
such an innovation. 
2.2. Culture and innovation 
Structure seems to be an important determinant for innovativeness. But the culture of 
an organization might be important as well. A definition of culture is not easy to give. 
There is a wide variety of definitions, most of which stem from either anthropology, 
sociology, or psychology (Von Grumbkow 1990). From the perspective of the IT 
department, definitions that stem from sociology tend to be the most suitable, since 
these definitions view culture from the perspective of groups. For the purpose of this 
research the definition of Edgar Schein is chosen. Schein describes the culture of an 
organization - or another group - as consisting of three layers (Schein 1985): 
o fundamental assumptions, which are the basic values by which every person in 
the group carries outs its tasks; 
o beliefs, which are practices that are not yet fundamental beliefs, but do some 
to be the correct way of performing tasks in the group; 
o expressions of culture, such as stories, heros, and the way the office is organi-
zed. 
As Schein argues, it is very difficult to arrive at the fundamental assumptions of a 
culture. One has to pass the other layers in order to arrive at them. As a conse-
quence, research on culture is often directed at expressions of culture. For the 
purpose of the research on CASE-technology this is not very suitable, because 
expressions do not seem to give any justification whether culture has any influence on 
the success of implementing CASE. Therefore, a different approach is taken, in which 
we base ourselves on research of Sanders and Neuijen (1989). Sanders and Neuijen 
investigated cultures of organizations in the Netherlands and Denmark. Instead of 
focusing on any of the three layers of Schein, they tried to identify dimensions on 
which culture could be described. These dimensions describe the type of expressions 
of culture, the type of beliefs, as well as the type of basic assumptions. 
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Based on in-depth interviews and questionnaires, Sanders and Neuijen identified six 
dimensions of culture: 
o process-orientation versus result-orientation; 
o people-centered versus task-orientation; 
o organizational-bound versus professional, i.e. bound to profession; 
o open versus closed; 
o tight control versus loose control; 
o pragmatic versus normative. 
Based on these six dimensions, it is possible to describe how the culture of an IT 
department influences the success of innovations as CASE-technology. For example, 
process-oriented companies or departments rely very much on formalization. People 
in this type of culture are usually risk-avers, and thus are likely to resist change, in 
contrast to the result-oriented culture. Task-oriented companies apply pressure to 
finish jobs within the required time and budget. In contrast to a people-centered 
culture, the task-oriented culture is not very interested in personal problems of 
individuals. When task-oriented companies introducé CASE-technology, the pressure 
will be high to complete the project within the required time, whereas people-
centered companies are likely to pay attention to the impact of the technology on 
individual work. 
What can be concluded from the discussion above is that several dimensions of 
culture seem to determine the degree to which an organization or department is 
innovative, whereas other dimensions not seem to do so. Thus, several characteristics 
of culture may be taken into account when implementing CASE-technology. We 
might even go one step further and argue that implementing CASE-technology is 
nothing but a process of changing the culture of the EDP department. In that case, by 
definition it is a form of organization development (OD, see for example, Burke 1982 
and 1987, Bennis et. al. 1970, French and Bell 1984), a process of unfreezing, 
changing and freezing the IT department. 
2.3. A link between culture and structure: the process of control 
Structure and culture are two concepts that are not totally orthogonal. Clearly there is 
a relationship between these two concepts. For example, machine bureaucracies are 
characterized by high formalization of rules and procedures, and thus by tight control, 
one of the dimensions of culture. Also, because a machine bureaucracy is rather 
formal, it tends to be process-oriented, whereas informal organizations as adhocracies 
tend to be result-oriented. So, several dimensions of culture tend to reflect themselves 
in the structure of organizations. The relationship between culture and structure is 
best described by the characteristics of control that culture and structure represent. 
Structure describes control in terms of degree of standardization and formalization of 
rules and procedures. Culture describes control in terms of process-orientation, tight 
or loose control, pragmatic versus normative, and people-centered versus task-
orientation. 
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In this paper, the focus of control is on internal control. Various descriptions exist of 
types of internal control (see, for example, Orlikowski 1991). We will rely on 
Hofstede (1978) to describe various types of control processes. According to Hofste-
de, a cybernetic philosophy is used for most management control processes. He 
argues that the cybernetic philosophy is based on several basic assumptions, e.g. 
actual accomplishment can be measured in a formal way. These assumptions subject 
the philosophy to severe limitations, since in most organizations one or more of these 
assumptions will not hold. In addition, even relatively machine-like processes, for 
which the assumptions are most justified, are in reality social. Hofstede arrivés at two 
alternative philosophies. A distinction is made between routine industrial-type 
processes, for which a homeostatic approach seems more suitable, and non-routine, 
non-industrial-type processes, for which a political paradigm is recommended. In a 
later publication, Hofstede also identifies an 'intuitive' control process, in which 
objectives and outputs of processes are known, but effects of interventions are not 
(Hofstede 1981). 
The cybernetic philosophy is comparable to the models O-I and O-II processes that 
Argyris and Schön (1978) identify. Model O-II can be described as a homeostatic 
learning process based on cybernetic principles. The homeostatic process is similar to 
the informal control process that Peters and Waterman (1982) identify. 
To sumrnarize, at management level a distinction can be made between: 
O departments that have a formal control process, characterized by model O-I of 
Argyris and Schön; 
o departments that have a homeostatic learning process, characterized by model 
O-II of Argyris and Schön; 
o departments that rely on an informal, political control process; 
o departments that rely on an informal, intuitive process. 
Departments using an informal control process are likely to be the most innovative. 
These departments rely on the process of trial and error. New technology is intro-
duced in the organization with little financial justification, but the culture will be 
result-oriented. Thus, a powerful pressure exists to try out new technology and 
achieve results with the technology. IT departments with a formal control process 
might not be eager to introducé new technologies as CASE, because detailed 
financial justification will be required. 
3. Implementation of CASE-technology in the Netherlands 
Based on the concepts discussed in the former section, research was carried out to 
assess the relevance of each of these concepts for the implementation process of 
CASE-technology. In this section the results of the empirical research are discussed. 
The results are discussed from two perspectives, the process of implementation and 
the success or result of the implementation. We start with an overview of the organiz-
ations that participated in the research. 
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3.1. Overview of organizations 
In order to assess to what extent the aspects discussed above are important when 
introducing CASE-technology, over 30 interviews where carried out with key persons 
of 18 organizations in the Netherlands that have implemented CASE-technology. To 
get a representative view of implementation of CASE in the Netherlands, both large 
and small companies where contacted, bot governmental and business organizations, 
in various sectors of the economy, such as banking, industry and transport. Also, 
different typeS of CASE were selected: Upper CASE as well as Lower CASE and 
Integrated CASE-technology1. 
Because CASE-technology is a rather new technology, the level of experience in 
managing and using this technology is low. Even mature or sophisticated EDP 
departments have very little experience with CASE. Of the companies that took part 
in the research, most of them had more than three years of experience with CASE-
technology. Seven of them implemented Integrated CASE, two a sophisticated type of 
Lower CASE environment, and nine Upper CASE-technology. 
Table II. Summary of characteristics of participating companies 
Company Branch Structure Major cultural 
characteristic 
Type of control 
process 
A Public bureaucratie tight model I 
B Banking political open political 
C Industry bureaucratie tight intuitive 
D Banking professional open model II 
E Banking professional professional model II 
F Energy bureaucratie risk-avers model I 
O Energy bureaucratie risk-avers model I 
H Banking political professional political 
I Banking political professional model I 
J Transp. bureaucratie risk-avers model I 
K Transp. political tight model I 
L Public professional tight model I 
M Industry political professional intuitive 
N Industry political professional intuitive 
O Transp. professional open model I 
P Agricul. professional tight model I 
Q Public professional open model I 
R Banking political tight political 
Upper CASE-tools are tools that support one or two of the initial phases of develop-
ment of information systems: usually analysis and design, sometimes planning. Lower 
CASE-tools typically support one or two of the later, 'lower' or technical, phases of 
information systems development: design, coding and testing. When most of the tasks of 
systems development, i.e. upper as well as lower, are support by a tooi, it is typically 
called an Integrated CASE environment. In this research, a tooi is called an Integrated 
environment when three or more phases of systems development are supported. 
T y p e o f 
CASE 
ICASE 
ICASE 
Upper 
ICASE 
ICASE 
Upper 
Upper 
Lower 
Lower 
Upper 
ICASE 
Upper 
ICASE 
Upper 
Upper 
Upper 
ICASE 
Upper 
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The companies that participated in the research did not only differ in size and sector 
of economy. They also differed in characteristics of culture and structure. The 
concepts of culture (Sanders and Neuijen) and structure (Mintzberg, Cusumano) were 
used to characterize the EDP department. Of the six structures of Mintzberg three 
were appropriate to characterize the EDP departments: politicized environment, 
machine bureaucracy and professional bureaucracy. Characteristics of simple struc-
ture, adhocracy and ideology were visible, but not dominating. Seven IT departments 
proved themselves to be heavily politicized, five could best be described as machine 
bureaucracy, whereas six could be described as professional bureaucracy. 
There was a wide variety of cultural characteristics of EDP departments, but most of 
them tended to be open, oriented towards tasks, and - what would be expected - had 
a strong Identification with profession, not with the company itself. Of the 18 IT 
departments, three did have an intuitive control process. Most of the departments, 
ten, had a formal process, a process comparable to model O-I. 
3.2. Two perspectives: process of change and result of the change 
An approach to implementing change, such as introduction of CASE-technology, can 
at least be characterized in two ways: the direction of the change, and the strategy for 
change. The direction of change represents which level in the organization initiates 
the change, and which level the change aims at. When higher management initiates 
the change and directs its efforts at the system developers, we speak of a top-down 
approach to change. When system developers initiate the change, and want to 
convince higher management of the usefulness of change, a bottom-up approach takes 
place. A combination of directions may also take place, e.g. when management pushes 
the system developers to change their way of working, to use CASE-technology, but 
leaves it to the system developers to work out the total change process. 
The other aspect of implementing changes is the strategy. Literature on change 
management strategies is numerous (see, for example, Vrakking and Cozijnsen 1986). 
For our research, we rely on the work of Zaltman, and Bennis (see Zaltman and 
Duncan 1977, Bennis et. al. 1970). Based on their work, the following strategies for 
change were be identified: 
o reeducative strategy: the effort is to 'teach' people that the required change is 
necessary. Usually rational arguments are used, sometimes normative. 
o persuasive strategy: the effort is to persuade people to use the new technology. 
So not only rational or normative arguments are used, but also some force or 
power. 
o power strategy: this strategy consists only of the use of power. Rational and 
normative arguments are scarcely used. 
Of the three types of strategies, the reeducative and persuasive strategies were used 
most often by the organizations investigated (see table III). The strategies were used 
with different directions, although for persuasive strategies the top-down approach did 
seem to dominate. All power strategies did have a top-down direction of change. 
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Apart from characteristics of change, the research also had the objective to identify 
key factors for the success of the implementation process of CASE. In order to 
identify these factors, a measure of success of the implementation process has to be 
defined. Based on the interview results, it was possible to use various measures of 
success of implementation. One obvious measure was to relate management objec-
tives to the actual achievements of these objectives. But such a measure is an 
indication of the overall success of CASE-technology. For our research, a measure of 
success of the change management process due to CASE was needed. Therefore, 
success of implementation was measured by the number of system developers that 
started using all the features of the CASE-environment during the time frame 
specified in the projectplan. If more than 50% used the tooi, the process of imple-
mentation was regarded as a success. 
Based on this measure of success, half of the companies were successful in introduc-
ing CASE-technology, and half of the companies were not. Other measures were 
applied to check differences between overall success of CASE and the success of the 
implementation process, but no significant differences were found. 
3.3. Culture and the implementation of CASE-technology 
Does implementation of CASE-technology result in a change in culture? In other 
words, is it a form of organization development, in which the IT department prog-
resses from one type of culture to another? To determine if a change in culture has 
occurred, a comparison based on the six dimensions of culture is not enough. A 
change in culture can take place, but still the organization can remain in the same 
type of dimensions as before the change. For example, due to CASE-technology, 
developers may create the assumption that 'there is no way to develop information 
systems except by rigidly using the tooi'. If the former assumption was that 'the best 
way to develop information systems is what everyone thinks is the best, as long as 
management controls it', a fundamental change in culture has taken place, but it has 
not changed any of the dimensions of culture. The dimensions of culture are continu-
ums. Thus, a culture can become more open, i.e. less closed, or more closed, i.e. less 
open. As a consequence, these dimensions can only be used to identify dramatic 
changes in culture, not fundamental but subtle changes. 
To assess whether a change in culture has taken place, it is better to investigate the 
forces that are used when unfreezing and freezing a culture. When these forces are 
apparent, a cultural change has taken place, be it with or without any awareness of it. 
Seven forces exist when changing a culture (for an in-depth discussion, see Sanders 
and Neuijen 1989, Berenschot projectteam cultuur 1988): 
o shock, the realization that some things that are taken for granted have to be 
changed; 
o spirit, there has to be a leader who acts with charisma, and who pulls every-
body towards the change; 
o vision, everybody, management as well as system developers, have a clear 
message what are the objectives and goals to be achieved; 
o structure, the way in which people work, interact and communicate has to 
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change; 
o suecess, the change process should have some short tem results, so the 
motivation will remain to stay along the path that was set out; 
o balance, create confidence of the people in the reqaired change, s© that 
everybody feels stronger during the process of change; 
o empowerment, visualize the results of the change process, in order to stabilize 
the change. 
Table III. The change process due to CASE in each participatiiig compairy 
Company Strategy Direction Number of Number of Suecess af 
unfrecze forces freeze forces change 
A persuasive top-down two none no 
B reeducative bottom-up none none no 
C persuasive combined one none no 
D persuasive top-down two three yes 
E persuasive top-down four three yes 
F rceducative combined none none no 
G reeducative combined none none no 
H power top-down three three yes 
I power top-down three three yes 
J reeducative bottom-up one none no 
K persuasive top-down three two yes 
L power top-down two three yes 
M reeducative top-down two none no 
N reeducative bottom-up one none no 
O persuasive top-down three three yes 
P persuasive top-down four three yes 
Q reeducative bottom-up two two yes 
R reeducative combined one none no 
The first three forces occur during the stage of unfreezing, the other four forces occur 
during the stage of refreezing. The more forces of change exist, the more it is possible 
to speak of a change in culture. Normally, for a change in culture all forces men-
tioned above should be used at a certain point in time during the change process. 
With respect to dimensions of cultures, closed cultures, as well as people-centered 
and risk-avers cultures, tended to be less successful in implementing CASE-technology 
than other cultures. The other dimensions of culture did not seem to influence the 
suecess of implementation. One very important eonclusion was that the more forces of 
cultural change existed, the more successful the implementation of CASE-technology 
would be. One may conclude from this that in order to be successful, CASE-imple-
mentation should be regarded as a process of organization development, a cultural 
change process. 
3.4. Structure of the IT organization and implementation of CASE-technology 
Most professionalised organizations were successful in implementing CASE-tech-
nology, whereas most bureaucratie organizations were unsuccessful in implementation 
of CASE-technology. Because bureaucratie organizations usually apply a reeducative 
strategy, these strategies are often the least successful. In addition, since bureaucratie 
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IT departments are often the large IT departments, there is a negative correlation 
between size and success of implementation. Large projects are just more difficult to 
manage than small ones. 
A political environment tended to successfully introducé CASE when a persuasive or 
power strategy was used. The explanation for this might be that in political IT 
departments, the success of implementation depends on the power of the initiator of 
change. When the initiator is very powerful, the strategy for change will often be 
persuasive or even a power strategy, and such a strategy is often tolerated. 
3.5. Control characteristics and implementation of CASE-technology 
In the former section four different types of control processes were identified: the 
intuitive process, the political process, the model O-I process and the model O-II 
process. The organizations having an intuitive control process were not successful, the 
ones having a double-loop learning process, model O-II, were. The success of the 
implementation process of CASE for the two other control processes seems to be 
determined by other variables than control. For these control processes, some 
implementations were successful, but others were not. 
4. Conclusions: implications for implementation of CASE-technology 
This article discussed interview research that was carried out at 18 companies to iden-
tify organizational aspects of implementation of CASE-technology. The research was 
carried out based on three concepts: culture, structure and the process of control. 
After a detailed discussion of each of these three concepts, the results of the research 
were presented from the perspective of these concepts. Although the sample of 
organizations is small, the sample is representative for the use of CASE-technology in. 
the Netherlands. Based on the research, several conclusions could be derived with 
respect to the type of approach to CASE-technology used, and the success of the 
various approaches: 
o there is a relation between the structure of the IT department and the imple-
mentation of CASE-technology. Most professional departments were success-
ful, most bureaucratie ones were not. 
o the strategy chosen for implementation is tightly linked to the structure of the 
IT department. Thus, there is also a relation between the strategy of change 
and the success of implementation of CASE. Because most bureaucratie 
departments used a reeducative strategy, these strategies were not successful, 
whereas most persuasive and power strategies were successful because the 
were used by either professional or political departments. 
o the direction of change is mostly influenced by the type of structure of the IT 
department and thus to the strategy of change. Most top-down approaches do 
seem to be successful. There is no relation between the type of control process 
and the direction of the change process due to CASE. 
o several characteristics of culture tend to have a negative impact on the success 
of implementation of CASE. Especially people-centered, risk-avers and closed 
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cultures have difficulty in implementing CASE-technology. 
o regarding control processes on a continuüm from intuitive,, ttopöifed, to 
model O-I, to model O-II, the more the control process resembles»afflieï O-
II control process, the more successful the implementation of CAiBwiËbe. 
o all three concepts of culture, structure and process of control #ö -suan to 
influence the success of implementation, but no single concept tteÉ% «q^lains 
the success. 
Apart from the conclusions presented above, the most important mixökmm of the 
research was that implementation of CASE-technology was onfy successfd: wkm it is 
was regarded as a process of changing the culture of the IT departmmt, - » n*toi it is 
regarded is a process of organization development. Thus, the approach t^distraflfegy of 
change should have taken into account several aspects of culture and stEKïtaa®. Note 
that this is something different than saying that the concept of cultöie «mfcencing 
the success of implementation of CASE. 
The consequences of these findings are threefold: 
• implementation of CASE is not different from other technologies wmss&iwmg tfee 
type of factors that play a role. Like 3GL and 4GL technology, it is veryifendaaiental, 
directly affecting the way of working in the organization. But whereas the way of 
working with 3GL and 4GL is in handbooks, with CASE it is in the techïolofg? itseif. 
Thus, the impact of CASE is much more dramatic (see Orlikowski 199% 
It would be too easy to argue that CASE-technology is just another tecitaology. 
CASE-technology is very different in at least one important respect: Shey way of 
working with the technology is controlled by the technology itseif. And in most cases, 
CASE-technology even forces a way of working. Because of this, the imps@t of CASE-
technology on the IT department is much more dramatic and fundamentsl than other 
technologies. CASE-technology has a direct effect on the way of working, on ©ontrol, 
and thus on the culture and structure of the organization. Based on thiswéwfjoint, it 
is best to compare CASE-technology to CAM, CAD and CAE, not to SEE and 4G1L 
DeLisi argues that culture is the most important factor for managing IFin the '90s 
(see DeLisi 1991), but for some technologies it does seem more obv»s than for 
other technologies. 
To implement CASE successfully, it looks like a process of business reenjpaeering for 
the IT department has to take place. CASE-technology is not just autcmmtïon of the 
existing process; a new business process for the IT department has to te- designed, 
just like for other business functions (see, for example, Davenport and Short 1990, 
Hammer 1990). 
• political and cultural aspects cannot be ignored by management whea implement-
ing CASE 
Although using power or secretly changing culture by introducing techaiogy-toys is 
regarded as 'dirty', it does seem to be the only way to introducé the technology 
successfully. For the past few decades, system developers have relÈei on their 
expertise, and slowly developed a position of power. By automating tie systems 
development process, CASE-technology is undermining this basis of power. So, 
implementation of this technology in most cases will result in a struggfe for power, 
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the system developers not wanting to use the new technology, the management does. 
The consequence is that not only the aspect of management is important, but as 
Schein describes, also the aspect of leadership. Leadership is different from manage-
ment in that management is constantly aware of the cultural and political environ-
ment, and that the major task of management is the creating of the appropriate 
culture. So, leaders have to create the proper cultural environment for change. Thus, 
it cannot be denied that sometimes subtle management strategies are important. 
Examples of these strategies are technological seduction - what we will call 'seducing 
the fox' - and implementation in very small steps - what is often called 'boiling the 
frog' (see Schein 1985). Technological seduction is an approach in which management 
introduces technology not because the technology should make work more effective of 
efficiënt, but for a completely other reason. Boiling the frog is a strategy in which a 
change is carried out in small steps. Each step is of little impact on the organization, 
but as a whole the total change is. The same occurs when boiling a frog: if the 
increase in temperature is very slight, the frog will not be aware of the increase, 
whereas the total increase will result in a temperature increase of 100 degrees. When 
CASE is implemented in very small steps, resistance to it may be diminished. But this 
contradicts the force of 'shock' which is one of the forces of unfreezing. So, imple-
mentation of CASE might be done in small steps to reduce the initial resistance to 
change. After the resistance is reduced, a 'shock' may be used to allow for the 
necessary change in culture. If the shock does not occur, a new philosophy of 
development might not be realised. 
In addition to political and cultural awareness, leadership requires management 
commitment and the careful selection of a pilot project. When a pilot project is used, 
it should not be too ambitious. An ambitious pilot project will make the pilot more 
important than the implementation of CASE, and applies pressure on the time frame 
of the project. Implementation of CASE takes time, and when a pilot requires a 
longer time frame than expected, this should not have negative impact on the efforts 
to implement CASE. 
• implementation of CASE-technology is often a matter of timing. By creating a very 
unstable situation, time not uncommonly solves a lot of resistance and problems of 
choice 
As described in this paper, bureaucratie organizations were all unsuccessful in 
implementing CASE-technology. This is not too surprising, because these organiz-
ations usually have to rely on reeducative strategies instead of on persuasive or power 
strategies. But reeducative strategies are not very successful, partly because system 
developers want to protect their basis of power, partly because groups of system 
developers exist that each have their own preference for specific types of technology. 
What remains is either to implement CASE-technology separately in each group and 
create interfaces between each environment, or fundamentally change the organiz-
ation. A bureaucratie environment is not the most obvious environment to introducé 
an innovation. 
But a bureaucratie organization is not the only type of organization in which CASE-
implementation will be difficult. Closed cultures, risk-avers cultures and people-
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centered cultures face difficulties as well. CASE-technology might be used to change 
these cultures, but it will take a subtle strategy, such as seducing the fox or boffing the 
frog. 
When comparing successful and unsuccessful cases, remarkable is that successful 
organization often combine reorganizations with the implementation of CASE-
technology, or are in such a bad situation that things have to change in order to 
survive. What happens is that, either deliberately of not, an unstable environment is 
created. As Zuijderhoudt says, a chaos should be created before a change process is 
started (see Zuijderhoudt 1990). Referring to the framework of Mintzberg, this results 
in an ad hoc organization, i.e. in a more innovative organization. By creating such 
instability, a need for change is created, which reduces or totally diminisiies the 
resistance to the new technology. 
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Appendix A 
There were several options for the research approach: case study, questionnaire, 
structured interview and unstructured interview. Because the problem area was 
relatively clear, an approach was chosen which consisted of five phases: 
o conduct several unstructured interviews. 
o based on the results of the unstructured interviews, define a framework that 
can be used for structured interviews. 
o select organizations that form a representative sample of impleinentations of 
CASE in the Netherlands. 
o conduct structured interviews (see table A-I). 
o feedback to the interviewed persons. 
The third phase, the selection process, was based on a large survey research in the 
Netherlands conducted by the Vrije University, SERC (Software Engineering 
Research Center) and the NGGO (Dutch Association of Users of Structured 
Methods). A detailed discussion of the results can be found in Kusters et. al. (1992). 
The survey was sent to 1800 companies, with a response rate of about 17%. The 
results provided us with characteristics of companies that had implemented CASE, 
such as branch, size, and type of CASE-technology. Based on these results, companies 
were selected and asked to participate in the interview research. 
Table A-l. Framework for the structured interviews 
Structured interview on organizational aspects of implementation of CASE-technology 
Section Comments 
1. General In this section, several general characteristics of the 
organization where asked for, such as organizational 
scheme, number of employee, and function of the 
person interviewed. 
2. IT facility In this section, several characteristics where asked with 
respect to developing, maintaining, planning for and 
implementation of information systerns were asked. 
This allowed us to assess the 'maturity' of the EDP de-
partment. 
3. Organizational Characteristics In this section several organizational characteristics of 
the EDP department were asked for: 
3.1.Culture Othe culture of the IT organization 
3.2.Structure Othe organizational structure 
3.3.Internat environment Oleadership stilt, power characteristics 
3.4.External environment O characteristics of the external environment (passive, 
dominated, etc) 
3.5.History, traditions Oimportant historical issues and traditions 
3.6.Technology Oimportance of technology for the company 
4. Implementation of CASE-technology specific questions regarding the way CASE was imple-
mented, who participated in the implementation pro-
cess, the type of CASE-technology, the impact on the 
organization, etc. 
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